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I. OFFSHORE DRILLING:A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
For the first time ever, America’s oil and gas industries are outproducing Russia’s.1 Saudi Arabia remains the world’s largest producer of
oil; however, America is now the second major player.2 This increase in
production is due to new technologies in the areas of both hydraulic
fracturing and offshore drilling.3 The offshore drilling industry is
expanding and will probably continue to expand due to all the untapped
land under oceans.4 American dependence on oil is not likely to wane
anytime soon, but “[t]he U.S. cannot achieve oil independence from landbased resources alone, and thus feels pressure to drill deep in the ocean
where there are promising large oil reserves, despite the technological
difficulties.”5 Americans need oil on a daily basis, but the oil companies’
practices often give rise to backlash from environmentalists and government
protection agencies; offshore drilling is a double-edged sword.6
On April 20, 2010, a British Petroleum (BP) offshore drilling unit
known as Deepwater Horizon exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, releasing
roughly five million barrels of oil into the ocean.7 The explosion and spill
1. Daniel Gilbert & Russell Gold, U.S. Is Overtaking Russia as Largest Oiland-Gas Producer, WALL STREET J., Oct. 2, 2013, https://perma.cc/P5ZAHQDY; Rebecca M. Bratspies, A Regulatory Wake-Up Call: Lessons from BP’s
Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 7, 12 (2011) (“The
Gulf of Mexico produces a quarter of the total U.S. oil production, or roughly 500
million barrels of oil per year.”).
2. Gilbert & Gold, supra note 1; see generally Thomas Eastment & Adam
White, We Need to Lift Permanently the Moratorium on Offshore Oil and Gas
Leasing, TRENDS (A.B.A.), Jan./Feb. 2009, at 6-7 (explaining how allowing
offshore drilling reduces the United States’ dependence on foreign oil).
3. Gilbert & Gold, supra note 1; Emily Gertz, Can Offshore Drilling Really
Make the U.S. Oil Independent?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Sept. 12, 2008),
https://perma.cc/9A6Z-VRFN.
4. Lauren Hunt Brogdon, A New Horizon?: The Need for Improved
Regulation of Deepwater Drilling, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 291, 294 (2012).
5. Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1083 (2011); Eastment & White, supra
note 2, at 6 (“Energy lies at the intersection of national security, environmental
protection, and economic health.”).
6. See Elise C. Powers, Big Oil, Big Consequences, and the Big Unknown:
Exploring the Legal, Regulatory, and Environmental Impact of the Gulf Oil Spill,
74 ALB. L. REV. 475, 479 (2011).
7. Gaia J. Larsen, Skewed Incentives: How Offshore Drilling Policies Fail
to Induce Innovation to Reduce Social and Environmental Costs, 31 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 139, 140 (2012); Bratspies, supra note 1, at 31 (“Deepwater Horizon

2018]

THE MORATORIUM AND THE DAMAGE DONE

411

gave rise to public demand for government intervention to prevent similar
disasters from occurring again in the future.8 The profits that oil companies
stand to make are largely concentrated with the oil companies themselves,
whereas the costs of spills “spread across a wide swath of society and the
environment.”9 In response to the spill, on May 28, 2010, President Obama
implemented a moratorium, or temporary suspension, on all offshore
drilling.10 The moratorium and the safeguards that followed were
controversial and initially caused financial setbacks for the entire American
oil industry.11 Some of these problems continue to this day.12

was considered among the most technologically advanced drilling platforms in
the world.”); Ryan Linsner, Ensuring Adequate Compensation to the Victims of
the Deepwater Horizon Explosion: Who Says You Can’t Teach an Old Dog New
Tricks?, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 515, 516-17 (2012) (explaining how the Gulf
of Mexico wound up absorbing more than 206 million gallons of oil because of
the spill); Roger J. Marzulla, Obama Administration Policy on Offshore Oil and
Gas Production: Consensus or Contempt?, 14 ENGAGE 49, 49 (Feb. 2013) (In an
effort to clean up, over $6 billion was spent.); Moratorium, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (Moratorium is defined as “[t]he suspension of a
specific activity.”).
8. See Brogdon, supra note 4, at 297. But see Brogdon, supra note 4, at 309
(explaining how when oil industry accidents occur, “regulators are under no
statutory obligation to modify their procedures in light of problems revealed by
the accident”).
9. See Bratspies, supra note 1, at 55 (pointing out that privatizing gains and
socializing losses gives rise to perverse incentives).
10. COLIN READ, BP AND THE MACONDO SPILL 3 (2011); Bratspies, supra
note 1 (“Deepwater oil production began in the Gulf of Mexico in 1979 with
Shell’s Cognac Field located in 1014 feet of water, then a record depth.”).
11. Mark A. Latham, Five Thousand Feet and Below: The Failure to
Adequately Regulate Deepwater Oil Production Technology, 38 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 343, 353 (2011); see e.g., The Obama Administration Is Slowly
Reissuing Offshore Drilling Permits, INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (Mar.
23, 2011), https://perma.cc/9X4V-SZP2 (“Because of the moratorium and de
facto moratorium, the United States lost an estimated 110,000 barrels per day in
2010 and 250,000 barrels per day in 2011 in the Gulf of Mexico.”).
12. Ken Silverstein, Obama’s Offshore Energy Policy Could Rescue Oil
and Gas Explorers, FORBES (July 28, 2014, 8:15 AM), https://perma.cc/6J3YRAFX. Since taking office January 20, 2017, President Donald Trump has
attempted to reverse some of the environmental regulations that were put into
place during the Obama administration. Ben Lefebvre, Oil and Gas Allies to
Trump: Slow Down, POLITICO (Aug. 25, 2017, 5:11 AM),
https://perma.cc/P76K-8AUM. This article was written pre-Trump and focuses
on actions taken by the Obama administrationafter Deepwater Horizon.
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This article focuses on how government-implemented edicts can
abruptly and adversely affect myriad companies and even lead some into
bankruptcy.13 The implementation of moratoria and the discretion used in
issuing them can create new and challenging problems. Part II discusses
how the moratorium following the spill was implemented, as well as an
overview of the economic nightmare that the moratorium caused for both
Gulf Coast areas and the offshore drilling industry.14 Part III addresses the
first lawsuit that questioned the legitimacy of the moratorium.15 Part IV
focuses on how the moratorium and its aftermath forced Seahawk Drilling
and ATP Oil & Gas into bankruptcy and analyzes the lasting effects of the
moratorium on these two major offshore drilling companies.16 Part V
examines what changes, if any, have been made to the offshore drilling
industry since the spill and subsequent moratorium.17 Part VI addresses
how other moratoria have been utilized in the past, both in the offshore
drilling arena and in other industries.18 Finally, Part VII provides three
recommendations concerning the use of moratoria in the United States.19
Included in this section is a brief discussion of how the industry may have
suffered less if the moratorium had merely been applied to BP’s
operations. This is followed by two additional recommended changes for
government-implemented moratoria.
II. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OFFSHORE DRILLING MORATORIUM
Over the years, presidents and Congress have had differing opinions
concerning drilling for oil, but one consistency is the idea that the
Department of the Interior (DOI) is tasked with considering the possible
detrimental consequences when dealing with leases to drill wells.20 After
the explosion, former Secretary of the DOI, Kenneth Salazar, submitted a
report to President Obama conveying his approval of a moratorium on
13. ATP Files for Bankruptcy. Blames Drilling Moratorium (USA),
OFFSHORE ENERGY TODAY (Aug. 18, 2012), https://perma.cc/5PT3-R7V4;
Seahawk Drilling Seeks Bankruptcy, To Sell Assets, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 2011,
5:32 PM), https://perma.cc/3ZAG-LT34.
14. See infra Part II.
15. Hornbeck Offshore Services LLC v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (2010);
infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. See infra Part VII.
20. Michael A. Livermore, Patience is an Economic Virtue: Real Options,
Natural Resources, and Offshore Oil, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 614 (2013).
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offshore drilling, and Obama directed Salazar to stop all drilling on the
Outer Continental Shelf for six months.21 In total, the moratorium put a
stop to thirty-three rigs.22 But one of the biggest problems was that even
after the moratorium was lifted, the government continued to treat the
offshore drilling companies as though the moratorium were still in
effect.23
In reference to the harm that the lack of permits caused, Louisiana
Senator Mary Landrieu stated, “I have repeatedly said that the
administration’s excruciatingly slow release of oil and gas permits will
cause job losses
How many more rigs have to leave and how many
more businesses have to close before it realizes the havoc the de facto
moratorium is wreaking on the Gulf Coast?”24 From 2008 to 2011, it was
estimated that the Gulf Coast states lost 60,000 jobs because of the
moratorium, which would not allow any new drilling permits in the area.25
Three months after the spill, the deepwater permits had fallen “71[%] from
their historical monthly average of 5.8 permits per month.”26 By July
2011, the new average was 1.7 new permits per month.27 A year after the
21. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES FOR
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (May 27, 2010),
https://perma.cc/2C3B-H3UN; Noelle Straub, Obama to Extend Deepwater
Drilling Moratorium, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire
/2010/05/27/27greenwire-obama-to-extend-deepwater-drilling-moratorium-8011
.html?pagewanted=all.
22. Charlie Savage, Drilling Ban Blocked; U.S. Will Issue New Order, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/us/23drill.html?_r=0.
23. Randy Stilley, A Preventable Bankruptcy in the Gulf of Mexico, WASH.
POST, Mar. 23, 2011, https://perma.cc/TT6E-UEXC; see, e.g., Ryan Dezember,
U.S. to Issue More Gulf Drilling Permits, WALL STREET J., Mar. 22, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704461304576216563662728
054 (explaining how it was months before oil companies received permits to drill
because of the new demands placed on the industry in an effort to prevent similar
accidents); see also The Obama Administration Is Slowly Reissuing Offshore
Drilling Permits, supra note 11 (“On February 28, 2010, BOEMRE issued its first
deepwater permit since the BP oil spill in April 2010 to Noble Energy Inc.,
allowing the company to resume work on a well that it had already drilled to
13,000 feet.”).
24. Amanda Carey, Seahawk Becomes First Gulf of Mexico Drilling
Company to File Bankruptcy Due to Offshore Drilling Moratorium, THE DAILY
CALLER (Feb. 15, 2011, 10:41 AM), https://perma.cc/B2AC-MTVM.
25. Rob Bluey, One Year After Oil Spill Was Stopped, Drilling Permits Down
Sharply, THE DAILY SIGNAL (July 15, 2011), https://perma.cc/2KHX-LREL.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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spill, only eleven deepwater permits had been issued.28 The House of
Representatives passed a bill on May 11, 2011, which required the
Secretary of Interior to make a decision on every deepwater application
within thirty days of its filing.29 The people of the Gulf region, including
all of the employees who lost their jobs, viewed this “de facto moratorium”
as a punishment to the entire Gulf region.30
One of the biggest hindrances offshore companies faced after the ban
was lifted was the new requirement of proving that the company could
contain a spill should it occur.31 This requirement tasked companies with
supplying specific data about their plans of preparedness in order to
receive a permit—information that none of the companies had ever
prepared. Only upon successfully proving that they could contain an oil
spill could companies apply for a permit.32 Exxon Mobil Corporation was
the first company to create and have its plan approved to receive a permit
for its lease.33 In response to the moratorium and the financial problems it
caused, several dozen companies filed suit against Salazar, which led to a
court-ordered lifting of the moratorium.34

28. Steve Hargreaves, Offshore Drilling: Slow Comeback After BP, CNN
MONEY (Apr. 20, 2011), https://perma.cc/DHJ8-UZYJ.
29. See Marzulla, supra note 7.
30. Id. (explaining how the incident was completely caused by a mistake on
BP’s behalf, and the company has at least taken some responsibility for its actions;
for instance, a $20 billion fund was put in place to pay businesses and individuals
who suffered losses in the Gulf).
31. Richard Thompson, Two Years After Moratorium Lifted, Many Expect
Gulf Oil Production to Soon Exceed Pre-Spill Levels, NOLA (Oct. 23, 2012),
https://perma.cc/NZG8-GLFY; See Bratspies, supra note 1, at 19 (This was of
particular importance because it took BP eighty-seven days to stop the leak.); id.
at 30 (Before this new requirement, the MMS had allowed drilling to continue if
the company merely determined that a spill was “unlikely.”); see also Brogdon,
supra note 4, at 305 (explaining how before the spill, MMS regulations merely
covered basic elements of a well’s design).
32. Chris Kahn, Oil Spill Containment System Unveiled By Oil Companies,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), https://perma.cc/G5G5-7HNM; Bratspies,
supra note 1, at 18 (“When the Macondo well blew out, BP had no plan for how to
stop the flow of oil from the well and no equipment with which to do it.”).
33. See Kahn, supra note 32.
34. Hornbeck Offshore Services LLC, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627.
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BANNING THE MORATORIUM: HORNBECK OFFSHORE SERVICES LLC
V. SALAZAR
The DOI is in charge of offshore rig leasing, but its decision-making
is subject to judicial scrutiny.35 In the first lawsuit filed in an attempt to
lift the ban, Hornbeck Offshore argued that the government’s issuing of a
moratorium was “arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of discretion.”36
Hornbeck sought an injunction to ban the enforcement of the moratorium
because it was interfering with and detrimentally affecting the offshore oil
industry’s business.37 A district court enjoined the enforcement of the ban,
and on June 22, 2010, it lifted the moratorium.38 Judge Feldman stated,
“[T]he blanket moratorium, with no parameters, seems to assume that
because one rig failed and although no one yet fully knows why, all
companies and rigs drilling new wells over 500 feet also universally
present an imminent danger.”39
The DOI appealed the injunction to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.40 The government requested to stay the decision to enjoin the
ban, but a three-judge panel denied the request.41 In response to the Fifth
Circuit’s ruling, Representative Pete Olson from the 22nd District of Texas
stated that such a “blanket moratorium” harms the economy and negatively
impacts the energy supply.42 He “urge[d] the Administration to take this
latest ruling to heart and forgo any additional attempts to decimate the deep
water offshore drilling industry.”43
Obama issued a second moratorium, which was promptly challenged.44
In a Policy Brief concerning judicial oversight, Kyle G. Bates described that
“[b]y replacing the May 20th moratorium with a practically identical one,
and then testifying in an open Senate hearing that the moratorium was still
35. See Livermore, supra note 20, at 618.
36. Hornbeck Offshore Servs. LLC, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 634; other companies
that had an interest in offshore drilling joined Hornbeck in the lawsuit.
37. Id. at 632.
38. Id. at 639.
39. See Livermore, supra note 20, at 622; Hornbeck Offshore Services LLC,
696 F. Supp. 2d at 638; Savage, supra note 22.
40. Hornbeck Offshore Services LLC v. Salazar, 396 Fed. App’x 147 (5th
Cir. 2010).
41. Tom Doggett & Jeremy Pelofsky, Court Refuses Stay in Deepwater
Drilling Case, REUTERS (July 8, 2010, 7:54 AM), https://perma.cc/6YMM-VW39.
42. Olson Applauds Fifth Circuit Ruling on Offshore Drilling Moratorium,
REPRESENTATIVE PETE OLSON (July 9, 2010), https://perma.cc/96KQ-BGFC.
43. Id.
44. See Latham, supra note 11.
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in effect, Salazar expressed clear intent to frustrate the court’s ability to
meaningfully rule on the merits by allowing the injury to continue.”45 The
second ban was lifted before its validity was decided.46 Even though the
outcome was a win for offshore drilling companies, the moratorium left
severe damage in its wake. Arguably, two of the biggest offshore drilling
companies at the time, Seahawk Drilling and ATP Oil & Gas, suffered the
worst damage.47
IV. THE LASTING EFFECTS OF THE MORATORIUM ON OFFSHORE OIL
COMPANIES: SEAHAWK DRILLING AND ATP OIL & GAS
“Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code (specifically including, but not
limited to, 11 U.S.C. § 362), a debtor is afforded certain protection against
its creditors.”48 Seahawk Drilling and ATP Oil & Gas, two Houston-based
companies, filed for protection against their creditors, both blaming the
moratorium for their bankruptcies.49 Seahawk Drilling was the first
offshore drilling company to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.50 The
Minerals Management Service (MMS) found that the moratorium would,
in fact, last longer than six months, which would be injurious to the
industry since it is an industry that relies on equipment and leases that are

45. Kyle G. Bates, Uncharted Waters: How Hornbeck Offshore Services,
LLC v. Salazar Highlights Core Problems with Judicial Oversight of Agency
Behavior, 5 LEGIS.& POL’Y BRIEF 173, 186 (2013).
46. See Latham, supra note 11.
47. See Seahawk Drilling Seeks Bankruptcy, To Sell Assets, supra note 13;
Christopher Helman, As Oil Company Files for Bankruptcy, CEO Blames Obama,
FORBES (Aug. 18, 2012, 9:43 AM), https://perma.cc/2D9F-V33W.
48. In re ATP Oil & Gas Corporation, Case No. 12-36187, KURTMAN CARSON
CONSULTANTS, https://perma.cc/E6AN-TWQZ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
49. See Seahawk Drilling Seeks Bankruptcy, To Sell Assets, supra note 13;
Helman, supra note 47; Spencer R. Burrows, An Oil Spill and Exceptions to the
Mootness Doctrine: Hornbeck v. Salazar Erroneously Decided?, 18 HASTINGS
W.-NW. J. ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 407, 424 (2012) (explaining how “the collateral
consequences of the first moratorium extend not only to the plaintiff drilling
companies, but also to all members of the public, both directly and indirectly
affected”).
50. See Carey, supra note 24.
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only useful for a limited amount of time.51 The shortage of drilling permits
led to ATP’s loss of business.52
Former Seahawk CEO Randy Stilley stated, “The decision by
regulators to arbitrarily construct unnecessary barriers to obtaining permits
they had traditionally authorized has had an adverse impact not only on
Seahawk, but on the sector as a whole.”53 After filing for bankruptcy
protection, Seahawk sold nearly all of its assets to Hercules Offshore, Inc.
for $105 million.54 Because of the massive asset sale to Hercules, Seahawk
continued to serve its customers and function without interruption.55
ATP resumed drilling in the Gulf of Mexico in the spring of 2012, but
it lost so much money that it could not recover during the interim between
the spill and the time in which it could begin to drill again.56 Paul
Bulmahn, founder and chairman of ATP, blamed the Obama
Administration’s “illegal ban” for his company’s implosion.57 Because of
the ban on drilling, money stopped coming in, but ATP still had all of its
expenses to pay, such as rig contracts and interest payments.58 ATP’s net
loss in 2010 was $349 million.59 In 2012, ATP had $3.64 billion in assets
and $3.49 billion in liabilities.60 Since ATP had a heavy rig concentration
in the Gulf of Mexico, the impact of the moratorium was devastating.61

51. Edward W. Thrasher, Cleaning Up the Muck: A Takings Analysis of the
Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling Following the BP Oil Spill, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 1285, 1295 (2012).
52. See Carey, supra note 24.
53. Seahawk Drilling Announces Sale of Assets to Hercules Offshore, PR
NEWSWIRE (Feb. 11, 2011), https://perma.cc/KKW6-H26N.
54. Id.
55. Id.; Stilley, supra note 23 (explaining that Hercules was able to stay in
business due to income from operations outside of the Gulf of Mexico).
56. Marie Baudette & Stephanie Gleason, Drilling Moratorium Leads ATP
to Chapter 11, GCAPTAIN MARITIME & OFFSHORE NEWS (Aug. 18, 2012),
https://perma.cc/94SB-W8TF.
57. See Helman, supra note 47; see also In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp., Case
No. 12-36187 (Isgur), No. 440 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2012); see also ATP
Oil & Gas Corp. v. The United States, Fed. Cl. 12-379C (2013). Bulmahn (ATP)
brought suit against the United States seeking $68 million in damages for the
moratorium for putting a halt to deepwater drilling for nearly a year and damaging
his company.
58. See Helman, supra note 47.
59. Id.
60. See Baudette & Gleason, supra note 56.
61. Id.
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On June 14, 2012, ATP brought a suit against the United States in the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims.62 ATP’s claims arose from contracts with
the U.S., as it acted through the DOI, MMS, Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management (BOEMRE), Salazar, and Michael Bromwich, the former
Director of BOEMRE.63 ATP alleged that when the DOI suspended all
offshore drilling activities, it breached the active oil and gas leases that the
DOI had previously issued to ATP.64 The complaint alleged that ATP
relied on the leases, and thereby suffered significant damages (in excess
of $68 million), including the termination of rig contracts, increased costs,
and delayed production, as a direct result of the breach.65
On August 17, 2012, ATP also filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection.66 Prior to the ban, ATP spent $800 million on a Gulf of Mexico
production platform, which was ready to begin production in 2010, but the
ban unfortunately forced ATP to stop its project.67 Still, after the ban was
lifted, ATP was unable to produce oil from its six wells in the Gulf of
Mexico.68 The exploitation of those wells would have greatly increased
ATP’s shareholder value and income and would have prevented ATP from
filing for bankruptcy.69 In an official statement, the company noted, “In
addition, these incremental cash flows would have mitigated or prevented
the need to enter into many of the financings ATP has closed since the
imposition of the moratoria—financings that require relatively high rates
of return and monthly payments.”70
62. ATP Oil & Gas v. United States, 2012 Ct. Fed. Cl. No. 12-379C.
63. Id.
64. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (The subject matter jurisdiction is pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), which provides:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort.).
65. ATP Oil & Gas, 2012 Ct. Fed. Cl. No. 12-379C.
66. See Helman, supra note 47.
67. Id.
68. See ATP Files for Bankruptcy. Blames Drilling Moratorium (USA), supra
note 13 (explaining that ATP had to file for bankruptcy because of “the imposition
beginning in May 2010 of the moratoria on drilling and related activities in the
Gulf of Mexico”); Baudette & Gleason, supra note 56.
69. See ATP Files for Bankruptcy. Blames Drilling Moratorium (USA), supra
note 13.
70. Id.
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During the six months the moratorium was in effect, significant
changes were made to the offshore drilling industry. The following section
provides an overview of the status of the offshore drilling industry for the
rest of Obama’s tenure, and how it might have been different had the oil
spill at Deepwater Horizon never occurred.
V. OFFSHORE DRILLING AFTER DEEPWATER HORIZON
There are obvious concerns about whether offshore oil can be
procured in a manner that is safe for the environment. The moratorium that
was enacted as an emergency response to one of the worst oil spills in the
history of drilling has proven to be extremely controversial.71 Further,
there are no laws in place to stop the government from implementing
additional bans on the offshore drilling industry, as well as on other
industries, in the future.72 The oil spill was a horrible accident,
environmentally and economically, but the implementation of a six-month
moratorium was not fruitful. In the months that followed the spill,
President Obama cited concerns about future oil spills in the Gulf of
Mexico and used the opportunity to publicly scold BP, but in effect, the
entire offshore drilling industry, as well as the American economy, was
harmed.73
The industry has evolved since the spill, but the moratorium itself had
little effect on improving industry practices and is viewed by some critics
today as more of a political move by the Obama administration.74 In her
article, A New Horizon?: The Need for Improved Regulation of Deepwater
Drilling, Lauren Hunt Brogdon adds, “Unfortunately, appropriately
protective regulations directed at the oil industry are usually only
implemented after a high-profile accident inflicts catastrophic and
71. Erik Milito, Offshore Drilling Is Safer, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2014, 1:23 PM),
https://perma.cc/777J-WD8S; Savage, supra note 22.
72. See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Regulatory Moratoria, 61 DUKE L.J.
1883 (2012) (explaining that issuing moratoria is a tool Presidents have in their
presidential toolbox).
73. Jeff Mason, Obama to Keep Drilling Moratorium for 6 Months-aide,
REUTERS (May 27, 2010 7:59 AM), https://perma.cc/HT4K-E4L5; Bratspies,
supra note 1 (explaining how “[a]ll of the major oil companies have a stake in the
deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico”); Brogdon, supra note 4, at 297-98 (explaining
how, ironically, just weeks before the spill, Obama “announced plans to expand
oil and natural gas exploratory efforts in the Atlantic Ocean and eastern Gulf of
Mexico”).
74. Interview with Russell Gold, Energy Reporter, Wall Street Journal, in
Lubbock, Tex. (Sept. 23, 2014).
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irreparable harm to human health, the environment, or the nation’s
economy.”75 Changes have been made since the spill, but these
modifications could have all been made with or without the moratorium.
A. The Spill Called into Question Longstanding MMS Shortcomings
In the United States, both the Coast Guard and the DOI monitor
offshore drilling.76 Prior to the spill, the MMS—which polices the safety
of offshore rigs—shared an office with the DOI’s oil leasing program.77
This situation created the potential for conflict.78 While the MMS and the
DOI were working together, the MMS wanted more regulation and the
DOI’s oil leasing program wanted less regulation.79 “Inspectors were
routinely treated to golf tournaments, hunting trips, fishing expeditions,
sporting tickets and other expensive ‘perks’ by the oil companies MMS
was supposed to be regulating.”80 MMS had the dual task to both regulate
and promote offshore drilling.81 After the spill, Obama divided the MMS
into two divisions but kept Secretary Salazar in charge of both.82
A failing blowout preventer caused the Deepwater Horizon spill.83
Not surprisingly, the MMS had no “established minimum capabilities for
blowout preventers or testing protocols.”84 Without fear of government
75. See Brogdon, supra note 4.
76. See Osofsky, supra note 5, at 1088.
77. Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House
Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL.& ADMIN. L. 209, 222 (2012); READ, supra
note 10, at 209 (explaining how MMS was the only agency in charge of inspecting
and overseeing drilling activities in the Gulf of Mexico).
78. See Steinzor, supra note 77.
79. Id.
80. See Bratspies, supra note 1, at 53.
81. Id. at 26-27.
82. See Steinzor, supra note 77 (On October 1, 2011, the MMS was divided
into the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM).); BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY
MANAGEMENT, https://perma.cc/6ZFA-PZL7 (last visited Jan. 15, 2018);
Bratspies, supra note 1 (Before the division, the MMS had been “responsible for
supervising all exploration and extraction of gas and mineral resources on federal
lands, including offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.”).
83. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 32.
84. Id.; READ, supra note 10, at 213 (“Various people have called into
question whether this lack of oversight was in deference to expertise, due to
incompetence or a too-cozy relationship between regulators and Big Oil, or the
product of outright corruption of the regulatory process.”).
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sanctions, there was little incentive for companies to spend money to
develop absolutely safe technologies.85 Generally, the oil industry would
rather invest in new extraction technologies than in safety, especially if it
is not being forced to invest in safety.86
Another key problem with the way the MMS oversaw potential leases
was that after receiving a request for a drilling permit, the MMS was on a
strict deadline, to the extent that it was required to determine whether a
permit would be awarded within thirty days of the request date.87 “The
agency is forced by this artificially short deadline to make critical decisions
on the basis of more-generic documents prepared for earlier stages of the
leasing process, rather than on site-specific information prepared
specifically with regard to the particular wells under consideration.”88 It
became well-known to lessees in the industry that the MMS did not have an
adequate amount of time to conduct a thorough investigation into the
environmental impacts should the proposed rig leak.89
There were major structural issues with the way offshore drilling was
being regulated by the government.90 A lack of regulation can easily lead
to environmentally risky behavior on the drilling front.91 Secretary Salazar
thought that the Deepwater Horizon spill illuminated the need to evaluate
whether safe drilling practices were being developed in order to deal with
the unique challenges deepwater drilling poses.92 To that end, Salazar
created a Safety Oversight Board93 which evaluated the effectiveness of
the BOEMRE and found there were not enough BOEMRE engineers to
review all of the Gulf of Mexico permit applications that were routinely
being filed.94 There were only fifty-five inspectors to cover the roughly
3,000 offshore platforms subject to inspection in the gulf.95 Further, there
was no formal system of regulations or even a handbook for the inspectors

85. See Bratspies, supra note 1, at 43.
86. Id. at 55.
87. Id. at 42.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 27.
91. Id.
92. See Latham, supra note 11, at 351.
93. Id. at 359.
94. Id. at 360; READ, supra note 10, at 209 (explaining that MMS changed its
name to BOEMRE two months after the deepwater accident; BOEMRE is in
charge of issuing industry-wide drilling safety obligations).
95. See Latham, supra note 11, at 361.

422

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. VI

of the platforms.96 BOEMRE attempted to implement industry-wide
safety regulations such as “a requirement to certify compliance with
existing regulations, signed by the operator’s chief executive officer;
submission of detailed information about blowout preventers in use;
retention of blowout preventer records; [and] third-party verification of
blowout preventer fitness.”97 Although the efforts of BOEMRE were a
step in the right direction, BOEMRE initially had problems carrying out
adequate solutions while dealing with restructuring issues of its own.98
Salazar also established the Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee
as an advisory committee made up of engineering scientific experts who can
provide guidance on improving the safety of offshore drilling and response
to spills.99 Also, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
(BSEE) was formed after the MMS was reorganized post-spill.100 The
Director of the BSEE, Brian Salerno, stated that as of spring 2014, “25 of
the 33 BP Deepwater Horizon Commission recommendations have been
acted upon or are in the process of being addressed.”101
B. A Failure to Pass New Legislation
The DOI has taken many steps to improve oversight of the offshore
oil industry, but until the legislature passes new regulations, these steps
are moot.102 During the Obama administration, Congress proposed, but
did not pass, measures to ensure that an event like the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill never happens again.103 California Representative George Miller

96. Id. at 360.
97. Id. at 353.
98. Id. at 353-54 (explaining how “[t]he same judge who enjoined the first
moratorium found that the new drilling safety obligations issued by the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) were
invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act”).
99. See Osofsky, supra note 5, at 1089.
100. See Milito, supra note 71.
101. Id.
102. See Bratspies, supra note 1, at 60.
103. See Powers, supra note 6; see also Bryan Walsh, The BP Oil Spill, One
Year On: Forgetting the Lessons of Drilling in the Gulf, TIME (Apr. 20, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2066233,00.html (explaining
that the biggest hurdle in making government changes in the area of oil and gas is
Congress, “which has largely failed to enact any legislation addressing the
problem”); see also Shiva Polefka, Three Years After Deepwater Horizon,
Congress Has Failed To Improve Drilling Safety, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 20,
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drafted legislation to prohibit BP from drilling for oil “in the outer
continental shelf” for five to seven years.104 Miller, the former U.S. House
Natural Resources Committee chairman, noted BP’s “pattern of
‘dangerous, lethal behavior’ in its refineries, pipelines, and drilling rigs in
the United States.”105 Miller thinks BP’s offshore drilling operations
should be stopped in an effort to protect the economy, the health of workers,
and America’s coastlines.106 This legislation was in line with the
recommendation provided by the National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 107 but unfortunately,
this Offshore Worker Whistleblower Protection Act did not make it through
the Senate.108 The latest action on it was July 8, 2013, when it was referred
to the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections.109 Unfortunately, the bill’s
text was later focused on protections for whistleblowing oil workers and had
moved away from anything concerning safety regulations.110
In another congressional effort, the House approved deepwater drilling
reforms, but the Republicans, who also threatened to filibuster these reforms
in the Senate, voted them down.111 There were initially seventy-five bills
introduced in Congress after the spill, but none of them focused on
2013, 6:54 PM), https://perma.cc/NV4U-ZK59 (showing how even three years
later, Congress still has not passed any legislation pertaining to the accident).
104. Brad Johnson, George Miller: Ban BP From US Drilling,
THINKPROGRESS (July 2, 2010, 10:30 PM), https://perma.cc/88HZ-RJE3.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id.; Polefka, supra note 103 (Obama selected a panel of experts to make
up the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling. The Commission’s final report “revealed the irresponsible practices of
BP and its contractors, uncovered a lack of federal oversight, and provided a
comprehensive set of policy reforms that would make the offshore energy industry
safer.”); Brogdon, supra note 4, at 300 (The Commission’s report is probably the
most comprehensive report the executive branch has ever issued concerning both
the causes and consequences of Deepwater Horizon.); Bratspies, supra note 1, at
10 (The Report identified the poor choices BP made, days before the spill, and the
day of the spill.). Brogdon, supra note 4, at 302 (explaining that the overall cause
of the blowout was “failure to contain hydrocarbon pressures in the well”); id. at
304 (The Commission also determined that “‘root causes’ of the Deepwater
Horizon spill were ‘overarching management failures by industry’ and ‘regulatory
failures’ by government agencies.”).
108. See Johnson, supra note 104.
109. Offshore Oil and Gas Worker Whistleblower Protection Act of 2013,
H.R. 1649, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
110. Id.
111. See Johnson, supra note 104.
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technical requirements.112 Instead, they pertained to liability for damages
to humans, economies, and the environment.113 “While a public call for
new legislation and corresponding legislative proposals immediately
followed the Deepwater Horizon spill, no law directly addressing
prevention of similar disasters was adopted.”114 Salazar recognized that
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill underscored the need to reassess whether
practices that were implemented for drilling operations in the past needed
to be improved to account for different challenges that deepwater drilling
poses.115 From the non-governmental side, the oil and gas industry began
working on a comprehensive offshore operations review even before the
Gulf of Mexico cleanup had been completed.116 Industry experts worked
with regulators from the DOI to develop new recommendations for
standards in the field.117
Erik Milito is a director of upstream and industry operations at the
American Petroleum Institute.118 He stated that one of the most important
issues that needed to be addressed was how to more quickly respond to an
oil leak.119 Containment companies that were established after the spill
have new technologies for handling spills at the wellhead.120 After the
spill, more than 100 of the American Petroleum Institute’s industry
standards have been made into federal regulations.121 Further, the oil and
gas industry created the Center for Offshore Safety (COS).122 The COS’s
mission is to “work with independent third-party auditors and government
regulators to create an industry-wide culture of continuous safety
improvement.”123 It is unclear whether all of these changes would have
occurred if it were not for the moratorium, but it seems more likely that
they were in direct response to the spill and not in response to the
moratorium.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Brogdon, supra note 4, at 311.
Id.
Id. at 310.
See Larsen, supra note 7, at 151.
See Milito, supra note 71.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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VI. WHY MORATORIA?
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the United States
Supreme Court held that only Congress, and not the president, had the
power to take over steel production because steel production is directly
related to commerce.124 It is the most important case regarding executive
power limits.125 In 1952, President Truman signed Executive Order
10,340, which gave the federal government control of eighty percent of
the steel mills.126 The order was an attempt to prevent the nation’s
steelworkers from striking because they wanted an increase in wages,
which could potentially morph into a national steelworker strike.127 By
placing the steel mills under federal control, the President was also trying
to ensure that there would be plenty of steel available for the war.128
Due to the national emergency at the time, President Truman felt as
though the executive order was valid, but the Court disagreed; even such
a state of emergency does not authorize presidents to sign such orders.129
Youngstown presents a slightly different issue than the offshore drilling
moratorium because it concerned an executive order; the offshore drilling
moratorium was an example of President Obama entrusting an agency
head, Salazar, with the decision to put a halt to an entire industry with a
moratorium, which President Obama then approved.130 Presidents always
oversee how agencies perform their functions.131 Even though an
executive order is administratively different than an agency-requested
moratorium, the intended result of the executive order in Youngstown was
similar to the outcome of the Deepwater moratorium, and the respective
courts struck down both the executive order and the moratorium.
Moratoria have been used in many contexts.132 They are generally
“used by administrative agencies as a common means to ‘preserve the
status quo while formulating a more permanent . . . strategy.’”133 A
124. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
125. John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders:
Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 382 (2010).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 382-83.
128. Id. at 383.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 382; U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 21; Straub, supra note 21.
131. See Duncan, supra note 125, at 336.
132. See Thrasher, supra note 51, at 1312 (explaining that moratoria have been
used for the death penalty, the killing of marine life, and oil and gas).
133. Id.
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moratorium was imposed in 2008 in an effort to improve the economy
when many believed there was a national foreclosure crisis.134 The stock
market fell by more than fifty percent, and because of the mortgage
foreclosures, the housing market nearly imploded.135 After the Great
Depression, foreclosure moratoria were enacted by either making the
foreclosure process more complicated with the addition of steps or by
forcing a judicial stay of foreclosure proceedings.136 The Federal National
Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
were companies sponsored by the government in an attempt to stabilize
mortgage lending in the U.S.137 In 2008, after multiple accounting
scandals, the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation were placed under the government’s
control and were subjected to moratoria.138 The hope was that if there were
a moratorium, there would be fewer foreclosures.139 Other major lending
companies followed in suit with their own moratoria, which essentially led
to the effect of a federal moratorium on lending.140
A second example of an emergency moratorium occurred on the heels
of the 2005 hurricane season.141 The McCarran-Ferguson Act empowers
states to adopt emergency moratoriums.142 Various insurance departments
in Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and Louisiana implemented emergency
regulations and moratorium statutes in an attempt to prevent market
withdrawals.143 If any large insurance company were to pull out of the
area, then the homeowner insurance marketplace would suffer locally.144
“By preventing market withdrawal, these states may potentially jeopardize
the continued solvency and viability of regional and national insurance
134. Benjamin A. Bauer, We Don’t Live Here Anymore: A Critical Analysis of
Government Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 121, 122 (2010).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 123.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 124.
139. Id. at 152 (explaining that despite moratoria efforts, the “foreclosure
tsunami” continued partly due to a lack of lenders who could not respond to the
modification requests).
140. Id. at 124.
141. Steven Plitt & Daniel Maldonado, When Constitutional Challenges to
State Cancellation Moratoriums Enacted After Catastrophic Hurricanes Fail: A
Call for a New Federal Insurance Program, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 41, 43 (2012).
142. Id. at 61.
143. Id. at 42.
144. Id.
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companies, which may affect citizens of non-hurricane-affected states, and
their respective state guaranty funds.”145
Hurricane Andrew led to the bankruptcy of multiple insurance
companies due to the policyholders’ claims exceeding the reinsurance that
had been set aside for claims.146 These bankruptcies gave rise to insurance
companies wanting to withdraw from southern Florida, but the Florida
Department of Insurance issued an emergency moratorium on cancelling or
not renewing homeowner policies for people residing in coastal counties.147
This state-imposed effort attempted to stabilize the marketplace for
residential homeowner’s insurance after Hurricane Andrew.148
Another moratorium was implemented during President George H.W.
Bush’s presidency.149 A ten-year moratorium, through an Executive
Order, was passed in order to prevent the exploration and development of
oil and natural gas in the Outer Continental Shelf.150 President Clinton
extended this moratorium, which was in place as an attempt to protect the
coasts, for two more years.151 Some federal lands, like national parks or
wilderness areas, have been set aside through congressional or presidential
designations instead of through moratoria, but the effect is the same.152
“Moratoria imposed by Congress and the executive have at different times
provided an important part of the legal backdrop to offshore oil
development.”153 These are examples of moratoria that had finite goals in
mind, but the implementation of the moratorium after Deepwater was not
under the guise of the improvement of anything. The section that follows
contains an analysis of why the government should have only
implemented a moratorium on BP, rather than on the entire offshore
drilling industry.

145. Id.
146. Id. at 48-49.
147. Id. at 49.
148. Id. at 49-50.
149. Kim Harb, The Legal and Policy Dilemma of Offshore Oil and Gas
Development, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 23, 23 (2004).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 26-27.
153. See Livermore, supra note 20, at 615.
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VII. A CHANGE IN THE WAY MORATORIA ARE USED
A. If There Had to be a Moratorium, Perhaps it Should Have Only
Applied to BP
After the Deepwater spill, BP’s history of safety breaches was called
into question.154 Historically, BP’s safety record is detestable, having been
the cause of multiple high-profile incidents.155 BP has invested more
money than any other company into drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, but of
all the oil companies, it has the worst safety record.156 BP currently holds
more leases in the Gulf of Mexico than any other company.157
In the past, BP caused many disasters.158 In 1988, 167 people died
when the Piper Alpha rig exploded.159 In 1999, Amoco, a corporation
which had a nearly equally bad safety record, merged with BP.160
Obviously, when BP absorbed Amoco, it took on the same problems
Amoco had been dealing with, while still facing all of the issues BP
already had.161 In 2001, eleven workers were killed on a platform off the
coast of Brazil.162 Four years later, BP’s Thunder Horse rig capsized in the
Gulf.163 Before selling it, BP’s biggest refinery was in Texas City,
Texas.164 When it exploded in 2005, fifteen workers died and more than
180 were injured.165 BP had committed over 300 safety violations and was
fined $21.3 million.166 Investigators discovered that the accident could
have been avoided with routine maintenance, but BP had been trying to

154. See READ, supra note 10, at 91.
155. See Bratspies, supra note 1, at 54.
156. Id. at 13, 22.
157. Id. at 13.
158. See Deepwater Drilling, supra note 10.
159. Terry Macalister, Oil Industry Defends its Safety Record, THE GUARDIAN
(Dec. 12, 2005, 7:53PM), https://perma.cc/H8UX-2Y6E.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 14.
164. See id. at 22.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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reduce costs and cut corners to the detriment of the company and the health
of its employees.167
It is easy to point fingers at the regulators for being ill-prepared and
ill-equipped to handle such an important and technologically complicated
task, but the training given to rig operators must also be considered.168
Offshore employees train on simulators, but they are insufficiently
prepared for emergencies, considering all of the different systems aboard
oil rigs and the different ways emergencies can occur.169 After the Texas
City incident, BP instituted changes in order to improve the safety
shortcomings that were part and parcel of the blast, such as making a single
common management system that defined the safety rules and safety
training for all refineries.170
Later in 2009, BP was fined $87.7 million for committing 709 various
violations in Texas City.171 BP was also forced to pay a $20 million
criminal fine because of a poorly maintained Alaskan pipeline, which led
to 300,000 gallons of crude oil spilling into Prudhoe Bay.172 This, too, was
followed by a promise from BP to improve its ways, yet BP still lags
behind other oil companies in safety requirements.173 A BP refinery in
Toledo, Ohio was found to have made willful safety violations and fined
$3 million.174 In total, BP committed 862 Occupational Safety and Health
Association violations between 2007 and 2010, which made up ninetyseven percent of the total violations committed by the entire oil and gas
industry in that time period.175 The commonality that existed after the
government investigated each BP incident was a poor safety culture.176 BP
is the biggest oil and gas producer in the nation, yet according to

167. Jan Mouawad, For BP, A History of Spills and Safety Lapses, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/09bp.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0.
168. See generally Brogdon, supra note 4, at 325-26 (explaining how critics
spend much less time discussing the training of rig workers compared to the time
spent complaining about the failures on the part of regulators).
169. Id. at 327.
170. See Mouawad, supra note 167.
171. See Bratspies, supra note 1, at 22.
172. Id. at 23.
173. See Mouawad, supra note 167.
174. Id.
175. See Bratspies, supra note 1, at 23.
176. Id. at 25.
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RiskMetrics energy research, BP’s environmental, safety, and health
records are worse than many of the major oil companies’ records.177
There was no one single equipment, procedural, or human failure that
gave rise to the Deepwater disaster.178 Following the spill, the U.S. House
Committee on Energy and Commerce found “BP repeatedly chose risky
procedures in order to reduce costs and save time and made minimal
efforts to contain the added risk.”179 Even in 2010, after the numerous
problems BP had encountered with spills, BP essentially assumed that
there was little risk of a spill, and MMS took that at face value.180 Rebecca
M. Bratspies believes that “MMS downplayed the risk of blowouts as
negligible and easily addressed by modern technology.”181 To be fair,
before Deepwater Horizon, this understanding was simply the standard;
Conoco, Chevron, Shell, and Exxon filled out their lease applications with
similar assumptions.182 All major oil companies were unprepared to
respond to major spills.183 Even with the cleanup effort after the spill, BP
used the same technology that had been deemed inadequate twenty years
earlier during the cleanup of the Exxon Valdez spill.184
One recommendation for how moratoria should be implemented in the
future is that the government should only be able to implement a
moratorium that applies solely to the tortfeasor. It is obvious from
assessing the effects of Deepwater Horizon how detrimental a moratorium
can be for an entire industry merely because of the mistakes of one
company. In this particular case, BP was the sole tortfeasor, yet all the
other offshore drilling companies suffered as a result of the six-month shut
down, as well as the various economies that depended on offshore
drilling.185 Should the government make sweeping decisions because of
177. See Mouawad, supra note 167.
178. See READ, supra note 10, at 124.
179. Id. at 115, 125 (explaining how the committee found that the five
contributing factors to the blowout were well design, centralizers, cement bond
log, mud circulation, and lockdown sleeve, but BP’s investigative taskforce
discovered eight breaches of protocol).
180. See Bratspies, supra note 1, at 46.
181. Id. at 44.
182. Id. at 46-47.
183. Id. at 47.
184. Id. at 49.
185. See Marzulla, supra note 7 (BP has seen its fair share of lawsuits
stemming from the spill. One of the most important lawsuits is the December 15,
2010 lawsuit the DOJ filed against BP alleging gross negligence); Baudette &
Gleason, supra note 56 (explaining how “the moratorium adversely affected all
companies involved in deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico”); see Latham,
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the actions of one company? As Judge Feldman noted, “If some drilling
equipment parts are flawed, is it rational to say all are? Are all airplanes a
danger because one was? All oil tankers like Exxon Valdez?”186 Just
because one company failed to follow correct protocol does not mean that
all of the companies in the industry are likely to do the same. To avoid
upsetting the economy in the future, the way moratoria are utilized and
implemented should be scrutinized and altered, and holding the tortfeasor
at fault by applying a moratorium only to the tortfeasor is one approach
that could be adopted.
B. A Compelling Reason and a Specific Goal
A second recommendation concerning how and when moratoria
should be issued is that the process of issuing a moratorium must be
formalized. If the government refuses merely to put a halt to the operations
of the company at fault for a disaster of this size, then there needs to be
formalized rules concerning the underlying reasons behind a moratorium,
as well as formalized rules concerning the length of time it can be
effective. There are currently no rules or stipulations concerning the length
of moratoria that the head of a government agency can request to be put
into effect by the president; it is completely up to the president’s
discretion.187 In a system in which so many other governmental actions
are subject to the checks and balances of other entities, this is strikingly
odd. Further, courts have already held that making a decision like this
under the guise of an emergency action will not be deemed legitimate.188
Since there is currently no set length for moratoria, then there is
nothing in place that could prevent heads of agencies in the future from
implementing moratoria that last even longer than six months. There is
hardly any precedent for how long a normal moratorium ought to last, so
this fact, coupled with a complete lack of rules and hardly any oversight,
is a recipe for disaster.189 Legislation should be passed with a formal set
of rules that must be followed if and when the head of a government
agency recommends that a moratorium be issued. Two things that ought
to be required are a compelling reason and a specific goal. Unless there is
supra note 11, at 364 (explaining how it is unclear whether BP has enough money
to compensate all the entities for damages which resulted from the spill, and it is
clear that it was negligence on BP’s part).
186. See Thrasher, supra note 51, at 1296.
187. See supra text accompanying note 130.
188. See supra text accompanying note 39; see supra Part VI.
189. See Thrasher, supra note 51, at 1312.
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a compelling reason to issue one (and merely an emergency situation is
not a compelling reason), with a stated specific goal, the government
should refrain from issuing moratoria. Congress ought to provide agency
heads with established rules concerning moratoria because currently there
are none. Also, perhaps Congress could require that more people, besides
the head of an agency and the president, be involved in the decisionmaking process to implement a moratorium.
C. Moratoria Should No Longer be Utilized to Temporarily Suspend the
Actions of an Entire Industry
A third and final recommendation is that Congress should prevent the
government from being able to issue moratoria altogether. This suggestion
is simply that there should be no more industry-wide moratoria, possibly
in any industry. The potential for economic chaos seems so much stronger
than does the possibility of any improvement that could occur during a ban.
Industry-wide improvements do not happen quickly; it is evident that
essentially all of the offshore drilling improvements could have been made
without a moratorium.190 Opponents of this recommendation may view it as
hamstringing the power of federal agencies, but it is obvious that the current
way agencies utilize moratoria is ineffective. Supporters of the postDeepwater moratorium argued it “was necessary because the government
simply could not risk the possibility of another spill,” yet there had not
been any similar Gulf of Mexico blowouts since 1969; there was little
reason to believe that another spill would happen anytime soon after
Deepwater.191 Salazar felt as though he had to act quickly, “but the broad
and dramatic oil-drilling moratorium, and its subsequent detrimental
impact on the oil industry in the Gulf, illustrates the dangerous potential
of reactive government regulation that forces innocent parties to bear a
burden more rightly placed on others.”192 Broad sweeping solutions such
as moratoria can rarely take full account of all the externalities that might
be created, which causes collateral damage to both the industry and the
economy.193

190.
191.
192.
193.

See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
See Thrasher, supra note 51, at 1291, 1321.
Id. at 1289.
See Bauer, supra note 134, at 160.
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CONCLUSION
There is a problem with how easily and loosely moratoria are
implemented. This article proposes three recommendations that could be
implemented through legislative action to ensure that entire industries do
not suffer because of a poorly proposed industry-wide ban. Heads of U.S.
federal agencies should be more mindful of harmful outcomes that could
result because of a rash ban, which will likely be lifted anyway. To this
end, there must be legislation in this area. These moratoria need only apply
to the tortfeasor; there needs to be a compelling reason for the moratorium
with stated end goals, or federal agencies should simply lose the power
entirely to issue a moratorium. Any of these three options is superior to
the current state of moratoria implementation.
Blanket moratoria “paint with too large of a brush.”194 The government
should be more intentional with its power to halt an entire industry. Shutting
down an entire industry for six months is entirely too long, especially
considering that multiple corporations were forced to file for bankruptcy as
a result of the shutdown. Any mandatory pause placed on oil companies is
not only bad for the oil companies, but more importantly, it is bad for the
economy.195 Whether one company or multiple companies are to blame for
a catastrophic environmental breach, it is in the United States’ best interest
for the government not to be able to shut down an entire industry for any
period of time, while in the interim giving rise to bankruptcies and
widespread economic hardship. The ability to implement moratoria is a
powerful and potentially deleterious government function, and it should
not be used to harm any industry, especially an industry that is so vital to
the American economy.

194. Id. at 157.
195. See, e.g., Tyler Priest, Should the U.S. Expand Offshore Oil Drilling?,
WALL STREET J., Apr. 14, 2013, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412
7887324020504578398610851042612 (“Annual federal proceeds from offshore
leases have ranged as high as $18 billion in recent years, second only to income
taxes as a revenue source.”).

